The remaining part of the job puzzle stems from the ebullient performance of productivity-that is, output per hour in the nonfarm business sector-which registered a growth rate of 3.2 percent in the four quarters ending in 1992:4, the most rapid rate recorded in any similar period This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation. Dan Aaronson provided able research assistance, and Sandy Choi typed the tables with admirable speed and accuracy. Martin N. Baily, Michael Harper, Jack E. Triplett, and participants in a NBER Productivity Research Meeting and at an American Economics Association session on productivity provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. Productivity-led growth is nothing but good news. In the two decades ending in mid-1992, the nonfarm business sector registered an average annual productivity growth rate of less than 1 percent: 0.85 percent, to be exact.5 Imagine the benefits to the economy if the recent good news on productivity were to imply, as some have suggested, a doubling in productivity growth to a rate of 1.7 percent over the next decade.6 For any given path of labor input, nonfarm private business output in the year 2003 would be almost 9 percent larger-some $450 billion moreallowing that much more private and/or public spending. Productivityled growth does not imply ajobless recovery in anything but the shortest run. Instead, any beneficial shock to productivity growth sets the stage for lower inflation that enables policymakers to stimulate output growth sufficiently to create the same number ofjobs that would have occurred in the absence of the shock. If thejobless character of the 1991-93 recovery indeed has been caused by a benign productivity shock, then its jobless character implies that there has been too little stimulus to output growth, not that a productivity surge must necessarily rob the nation of jobs. This paper takes a skeptical view of the widely held belief that a new era of faster productivity growth is at hand. Weighed against the innumerable tales of corporate restructuring and downsizing is a much more pessimistic story told by the official data on productivity growth over the last few years.
longer afford to subsidize the bloat of unproductive workers . . . These efficiency breakthroughs have taken a steep toll on an entirely new class of victims-white-collar workers. White-collar unemployment now exceeds blue-collar joblessness by 200,000 workers, the first such gap on record."'12 this stage of the business cycle? The econometric analysis of this paper provides an answer to this and other related questions.
Separating Trend and Cycle
At least since the early 1960s, when Thor Hultgren14 and Arthur M. Okun'5 published their analyses, macroeconomists have known that productivity exhibits procyclical fluctuations. Any evaluation of the long-term productivity performance of the economy requires that the underlying trend be unscrambled from quarter-to-quarter cyclical movements. This task cannot be achieved simply by measuring productivity growth between successive NBER-demarcated cyclical peaks or between successive troughs, for at least three reasons. First, productivity is a leading indicator and reaches its peak at a different point in the cycle from the official National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) peak. Second, cycles are of different durations and amplitudes, and so the relationship of the productivity peak to the NBER peak is variable, rather than fixed. Third, the last stage of the business cycle expansion is marked by a regular phenomenon that I have previously called the endof-expansion effect, the unusually slow productivity growth that seems to occur in the last year or two before the NBER peak. 16 The importance of separating trend from cycle is motivated by many considerations in addition to the natural interest in whether the economy's long-term productivity performance has gotten better or worse. First, any evaluation of past economic policies, such as the effect of supply-side tax cuts or R&D tax credits, requires a measure of their effect on cyclically adjusted productivity growth. Second, assessments of the performance of political eras, such as the Eisenhower era or the ReaganBush era, must refer to productivity purged of purely cyclical effects. Finally, estimates of future growth in potential output (that is, trend productivity plus trend hours) are needed to project the federal budget, the likely path of unemployment, and even the inflationary consequences of alternative monetary policies. This paper's basic purpose is to develop a method for determining what information about the underlying trend is provided by the latest 14. Hultgren (1960) . 15. Okun(1962) . 16. Gordon (1979) . data on actual productivity movements. The second part begins with data issues, which play a surprisingly important role in assessing the validity of the interpretation of a new era. The third part then assesses two alternative detrending techniques and describes the data on actual and trend movements in average labor productivity (ALP) and multifactor productivity (MFP). The fourth part sets out the specification of a timeseries regression equation that identifies the cyclical parameters and also presents the estimated equations. The fifth part then provides alternative measures of the underlying trend for 1987-92 that result in the best fit to the cyclical adjustment model. The section also computes forecasts of productivity growth over the 1993-94 period. The sixth and final part presents conclusions.
All the empirical analysis is carried out for three sectors-nonfarm business, manufacturing, and the nonfarm nonmanufacturing business sector (NFNM). While historical growth rates are displayed for both average labor productivity and multifactor productivity, the econometric analysis concentrates entirely on average labor productivity.
Data and Detrending
There are three official sources of data on productivity for the U.S. economy. Annual data on gross product originating (that is, value added) and hours worked are part of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 17 Unfortunately, the NIPA data for output by industry are not currently available after 1989. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides data on gross output, employment, and (in some cases) hours worked for a long list of industries in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors; these are available through 1990 (or, in some cases, 1991). But the BLS provides no aggregates corresponding to its industry-by-industry measures. Both the NIPA and BLS industry measures share a defect; they are available only annually and thus are not suitable for a study of high-frequency time-series dynamics.
17. Hours worked are provided for major industrial sectors at roughly the one-digit level (NIPA table 6.11), while output (table 6.2) and persons engaged (table 6. lOb) are provided for a much longer list of two-digit industries. Thus by default this study uses the third data source based on Productivity and Costs, the BLS quarterly series on output and hours worked in the private nonfarm economy and in manufacturing. The BLS also publishes annual series for these two sectors on capital input and capital's income share-required ingredients in computing its annual measures of MFP. Here I interpolate the capital input and income share data from the annual to the quarterly frequency (using overlapping four-quarter moving averages) in order to compute a quarterly series on MFP for each sector.
While the BLS does not publish series for the NFNM sector, these can be calculated as a residual. I calculate NFNM by multiplying the BLS index numbers for the aggregate series and for manufacturing by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) absolute levels of output, hours, and capital input in 1982. The NFNM totals are then obtained by subtraction and are converted back to index numbers.
The underlying source for the BLS output measure in the private nonfarm sector is the NIPA quarterly series on GDP, minus general government, farm output, output of nonprofit institutions, output of paid employees of private households, the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings, and the statistical discrepancy. The hours data are obtained from the monthly payroll employment survey, combined with hours per employee from the BLS hours at work survey. Adjustments are made to exclude from labor input the same sectors that are subtracted from GDP in obtaining the output series. The annual capital input and capital share are recomputed by the BLS from BEA data.
To obtain quarterly data on manufacturing output, the BLS takes quarterly movements in the Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production (IIP) and adjusts these to the annual manufacturing output levels in the NIPA. Because the NIPA do not yet include annual series on manufacturing output for the period after 1989, the BLS extrapolates the NIPA output series with the IIP.
Data Issues
By far the most important data issue for the results of this paper is the so-called base-year weighting bias. This bias understates the growth rate of productivity before 1987. This substantially raises the hurdle to be leaped by those who would proclaim a new era of productivity growth, because the economy's productivity performance during the slowdown from 1972 to 1987 was substantially better than is indicated by the currently published official data.
THE BASE-YEAR WEIGHTING BIAS.
The BLS output data used in this paper for the aggregate economy (that is, the nonfarm business sector) reflect the rebasing of output deflators from 1982 to 1987 prices. While the BEA has not yet published manufacturing output data for the 1987 base year, it has prepared for the BLS productivity program an unpublished series of revised 1987-weighted manufacturing output data covering 1977-89.18 Thus the BLS output data used in this paper provide a consistent treatment of the aggregate economy and of manufacturing, which allows nonfarm nonmanufacturing output to be extracted as a residual. However, as is well known, output measures based on the fixed weights of a single year lead to a systematic bias: for products such as computers with a rapidly declining relative price, the share of output in higher aggregates (such as manufacturing, producers' durable equipment, and GDP) will be exaggerated in each year after the base year and understated in each year before the base year. The base-year bias correspondingly causes the annual growth rate of output and of productivity to be understated in each year prior to the base year and overstated in each year after the base year. Table 1 summarizes what is known about the base-year bias in the BEA output series for the aggregate economy for the 1959-90 period and for manufacturing during the 1977-87 period. Bias is measured here by the difference between the data based on 1987 weights and on data calculated using BEA's benchmark-year series. The latter is based on a geometric mean of indexes from succeeding BEA benchmark years, which are five years apart. '9 I have supplemented published BEA estimates of the base-year bias by providing an estimate of the manufacturing bias for 1972-77, derived the implied base-year bias for nonfarm nonmanufacturing for 1972-87, and then applied these bias figures to the published 18. I am grateful to Michael Harper for providing me with a BLS press release dated March 26, 1992, that describes the special BEA series on manufacturing output used by the BLS productivity program.
19. See Young (1992) for more detailed information about fixed-weight and benchmark-years indexes. While no estimate is available of the base-year bias for manufacturing after 1987, one would assume that it might be relatively large for 1987-92, the first five years after the base year. The best guess that might pin down the approximate size of the bias comes from the BEA's estimate that with 1982 weights, the growth in manufacturing output for 1982-87 is overstated by 0.8 percent per year.20 However, a mitigating factor is that the BEA has not calculated manufacturing output after 1989, and instead the BLS extrapolates the 1989-92 values using the IIP, which is not subject to the same type of base-year bias.
IIP USE OF EMPLOYMENT
DATA.
Monthly changes in the IIP are partly based on employment data. To the extent that productivity is procyclical, output measures based on the IIP will understate the degree of cyclicality. Assuming that quarterly fluctuations in GDP are accurate, the use of IIP to create the manufacturing output series leads to an understatement of the procyclicality in manufacturing productivity and the opposite bias for NFNM productivity, because the latter is calculated as a residual. More generally, the calculation of NFNM data as a residual will lead to measurement errors that go in the opposite direction from errors in the manufacturing data. However, because the NFNM sector is three times larger than the manufacturing sector in absolute size, any such measurement errors in percentage change data for NFNM will be one-third the size of the corresponding errors in manufacturing. 
Detrending
The basic question addressed by this paper is whether the underlying trend of average labor productivity has accelerated in recent years. Much recent empirical work in macroeconomics uses the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which allows the trend to move continuously.23 The trend that emerges from the H-P filter calculation depends on the user's choice of a smoothness parameter. At one extreme, the choice of a parameter of zero yields a trend that exactly tracks every value of the series being detrended. At the other extreme, a parameter of infinity yields a single straight loglinear trend. Between zero and infinity, a relatively low value for the smoothness parameter creates a trend series that bends frequently in response to changes in the actual series and hence implies relatively small deviations from trend; a high parameter value creates a relatively smooth trend and relatively larger deviations from trend. The parameter endorsed by Hodrick and Prescott is a relatively low value (1,600) that implies implausibly large accelerations and decelerations of the trend within each business cycle.24 Table 2 compares actual growth rates of average labor productivity for three periods-1972-87, 1987-90, and 1990-92-with computed H-P trends for ALP, using five alternative values of the smoothness parameter. This comparison is displayed from the top to the bottom of table 2 for the three sectors (nonfarm business, manufacturing, and NFNM). As would be expected, the coherence of the H-P trend with the growth rates of the actual values is greatest for the lowest numerical 23. Hodrick and Prescott (1981) . 24. Hodrick and Prescott (1981, pp. 5-8) provide a justification of a value for their smoothness parameter of 1,600, and this has been used in their subsequent work (such as Prescott, 1986 ) and the work of most other H-P users. Yet this justification is based entirely on a subjective statement: "Our prior view is that a five percent cyclical component is moderately large as is a one-eighth of one percent change in the growth rate in a quarter. This value of the smoothness parameter. As the smoothness parameter increases, the computed trend is equalized across the three subperiods. Despite these patterns, the choice of the smoothness parameter does not appear to make much difference; for the nonfarm business sector in the top section of the table, any parameter of 1,600 or more yields a trend for 1990-92 of only 0.6 percent at most-well below the 0.99 percent actual rate recorded from 1972-87. In the NFNM sector, the H-P trends of around 0.1 percent per year are also well below the actual 1972-87 rate of 0.48 percent. Only in manufacturing is there a post-1987 acceleration, and here the actual value grows so smoothly that all the alternative H-P trends grow at a rate roughly similar to that of the actual value.
Figure 1 displays one of the computed H-P trends for the nonfarm business sector (this series assumes a smoothness parameter of 25,600) and compares it with the actual values over the 1972-92 period. Note that the actual value in late 1992 rises well above the H-P trend, in contrast to the 1983-84 recovery when the actual value did not significantly exceed the trend. This contrast suggests that the computed H-P trends for the recent period may grow too slowly. But figure 1 also illustrates a The alternative detrending technique used in the rest of this paper is to draw piecewise loglinear trends through selected benchmark quarters. This technique has the advantage that it can use outside information on variables other than the one being detrended-for example, such variables as unemployment and the capacity utilization rate-to select benchmark quarters having similar cyclical characteristics.25 A further advantage of piecewise trends is that there is one trend per business cycle, thus achieving a clean break between the business cycle fre-25. In contrast, the univariate H-P technique ignores outside information. For instance, using the same smoothness parameter as that recommended by Hodrick and Prescott (1,600), Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott (1990, chart 2, p. 9) illustrate the log levels of actual and trend real GNP and show that almost the entire boom of the 1960s is interpreted as an acceleration of the trend, rather than a deviation of actual above the trend. This ignores outside information, such as the fact the that the unemployment rate in the mid-1960s was unusually low and that the capacity utilization rate was unusually high. The business cycle in productivity differs from that in output. Figure  2 shows two measures of productivity and the dating of the expansion effects. Note that by this dating, productivity leads the output cycle, which is marked by the dashed vertical lines that identify NBER peaks. Productivity tends to reach its peak relative to trend when output is growing most rapidly. Further, productivity tends to perform poorly at the end of expansions. These observations suggest that benchmark quarters should be chosen by three criteria: to maintain roughly the same level of utilization of resources across cycles; to choose points at which the growth characteristics of output are roughly similar; and to exclude end-of-expansion periods. Six benchmark quarters that meet these criteria are displayed in table 3. Note that I exclude the short business cycles containing the incomplete recoveries of 1958-59 and 1980-8 1.
For the remaining six cycles, I choose quarters in which the unemployment rate was roughly equal to the natural rate identified in my previous research on inflation.26 Two such quarters occur in each cycle: one when unemployment is falling and another when unemployment is ris-26. For example, see Gordon (1982) . a. Cfiteria for selection are as follows: the unemployment rate, U,, is as close as possible to the natural rate of unemployment as calculated in Gordon (1993, appendix table A-2); the unemployment rate is falling; and the endof-expansion effect dummy is nonoperative (Dk = 0 in equation I of the text).
b. The output ratio is the ratio of actual to natural output.
ing. I chose the former quarter; hence my benchmark quarters tend to be periods when output is rising relatively fast and thus productivity is relatively high. As a result, actual productivity is below trend on average over the postwar period. Table 3 
Econometric Specification and Estimation
The rest of the paper is limited to an analysis of ALP; the same technique can be applied to MFP. To the extent that MFP is a more fundamental measure of underlying technical progress, my examination of ALP must be treated as an approximation. However, two problems arise with MFP that give ALP priority. First, several additional measurement errors enter into the calculation of MFP: errors in capital input and in capital's income share as a proxy for the true elasticity of output to capital. In addition, the maintained assumption of constant returns to scale may involve an error. Also, to develop predictions of future growth in potential output needed for forecasts of the federal budget, unemployment, and so on, an estimate of future MFP growth must be supplemented with predictions of growth in both labor and capital input. In contrast, in order to predict future growth in potential output, a forecast of future ALP growth needs to be joined only by a forecast of trend hours growth, which is less subject to error and does not require forecasts of investment behavior.
Dynamic Specification and the End-of-Expansion Effect
Following the 1974 work of Christopher Sims and my own 1979 work,28 I estimate equations in which the dependent variable is the first difference of the log of hours relative to its trend (Ah -Ah*). This is regressed on a series of lagged dependent variable terms and on the first difference of deviations of the log of output from its trend (Aq -/q*). The output deviation variable in principle can enter with leads, the current value, and lags. The lags can be interpreted as reflecting adjustment costs: that is, delays in hiring and firing. The use of leads was introduced by Sims in the context of his analysis of Granger causality between hours and output.29 A structural interpretation of leading output vari-28. See Sims (1974) and Gordon (1979) . 29. Sims (1974) . ables is that the choice of labor input is based in part on a forecast of future changes in output.
Two additional variables are added to the traditional regression that relates first differences of hours deviations to first differences of output deviations. The first is an error-correction term. Recently, the concept of error correction has been linked to that of cointegration, which can be defined informally as the notion that a linear combination of two seriesfor example, the hours deviation and the output deviation-is stationary.30 When two such variables are cointegrated, a regression consisting entirely of differenced data will be misspecified, while a regression consisting entirely of level data will omit important constraints. The solution is to estimate a regression of the first difference of one variable on the first difference of the other, plus an error correction variable consisting of the lagged log ratio of one variable to the other.3'
In my 1979 work, I identified a tendency for labor input to grow more rapidly than can be explained by output changes in the late stages of the business expansion.32 I dubbed this tendency toward overhiring the endof-expansion effect and argued that it was balanced by a tendency to underhire in the first two years or so after the end of the expansion. In this paper, I adopt a more systematic approach to defining and interpreting the EOE effect. According to the NBER definition, the expansion ends when real output (actually a collection of coincident indicators) reaches its absolute peak. This can be distinguished from the earlier peak of the growth cycle when output reaches its highest level relative to trend or potential output. The EOE period is defined here as the interval between the peak of the growth cycle and the peak of the NBER cycle; by definition, it is a period when output displays positive but subnormal growth. The overhiring that consistently occurs during the EOE period can be interpreted as resulting from individual firms incorrectly expecting that their output will keep rising at or above trend, while output for the aggregate economy turns out to grow more slowly than its trend rate.
The EOE effect is introduced into the regression equation through a set of six dummy variables. These are not 0,1 dummies; rather, they are The specification of hours adjustment in equation 1 implies that there are four different time frequencies relevant for productivity analysis. At the highest frequency, the deviation from trend of labor input adjusts with a lag distribution spreading over four calendar quarters to deviations from trend of output, and as a result, productivity movements lead those in output by a few months. This high-frequency movement occurs with the same lead-lag pattern whether the business cycle lasts two years or ten. The second frequency is cyclical and reflects the fact that hours respond to a sustained movement of output away from trend with an elasticity below unity, about 0.72. Thus ALP responds to a sustained movement of output away from trend with an elasticity of about 0.28. The third frequency is also cyclical. This is the end-of-expansion effect: the slump in productivity that appears to occur repeatedly between the peak of the growth cycle and the peak of the NBER cycle. Finally, the fourth frequency is the trend itself that emerges when the parameters 37. The F(5,139) ratio for the difference in fit between the equations in the third column of table 5, using six different EOE coefficients and a single EOE coefficient, is 0.24, as compared to the 5 percent critical value of 2.27. governing the other three frequencies are identified; the loglinear trendsthrough-benchmarks technique allows the trend to vary from one business cycle to the next.
Estimation: The Two Subsectors
Tables 6 and 7 display estimated parameters in the same format as table 5 for the manufacturing and NFNM sectors. As would be expected, 38. The EOE dummies are identical in the two subsectors as in the aggregate; no searching was done to locate the best-fitting timing of the correction period. Table 6 reflects the higher volatility of manufacturing hours and output; both the R2 and the standard error of estimate are higher than in table 5. In all columns of table 6, the response of hours deviations to output deviations is smaller over the first four quarters than for the nonfarm business sector in table 5; this implies that, on average, productivity displays a larger response to cyclical output deviations in the manufacturing sector than in the total economy.
An interesting result is that in the 1988-92 cycle, the end-of-expansion effect in manufacturing is unusually low and in NFNM is unusually high. In contrast, the end-of-expansion effect in manufacturing was unusually high for 1978-82, the "Rust Belt" episode. These estimated coefficients support the thrust of popular commentary. The early 1980s witnessed an unusually savage downsizing of manufacturing employment, whereas the early 1990s have witnessed a corporate downsizing movement in the NFNM sector. The difference between the journalistic version of these episodes and my econometric version, however, is that in each case there was end-of-expansion overhiring that preceded the downsizing. Journalists, by contrast, focus on the firings and layoffs, while omitting mention of the overhiring that came earlier.
The Underlying Trend in Labor's Average Product, 1987-92
The specification of the econometric equation estimated in the previous section requires that the first difference of hours and of output be expressed as deviations from trend. For the period through 1987, loglinear trends are extended between the benchmark quarters listed in table 3. However, there is no benchmark quarter after 1987, because at the end of the sample period in late 1992, the unemployment rate remained well above its natural rate of about 6 percent.39 All the estimates discussed in the previous section assume arbitrarily that the productivity trend recorded in 1972-87 continues during 1987-92.4? In this section, I 39. Recall that the criteria for a benchmark quarter are that the unemployment rate is close to the natural rate, currently about 6 percent; that the unemployment rate is falling (thus ruling out the period in late 1990 when the unemployment rate was 6 percent but unemployment was rising); and that the end-of-expansion effect is nonoperative.
40. More precisely, a trend for hours is established for each of the three sectors, and then the output trend is equal to the hours trend plus the assumed productivity trend. To fix the hours trend in all the regressions estimated in tables 4-7, I assumed that a 6 percent search for the optimal 1987-92 productivity trend that yields the bestfitting equations estimated for the period 1973-92. table displays the weighted average of the two subsectors; the implied optimal productivity trend for the nonfarm business sector is 1.26 percent per year, more rapid than the direct estimate of 1.10 percent in the first section. In view of the numerous sources of measurement error in the subsector data, the direct estimates in the first section are probably more reliable than the estimates in the fourth section based on subsector data.
Interpreting Cyclical Fluctuations in Productivity
The distinguishing feature of productivity change in the aggregate economy over the past five years is a long period of zero growth during 1987-91, followed by a sharp upsurge in 1992. Can this record be interpreted as normal cyclical behavior? The performance of the basic equation (with the standard EOE effect and optimal 1987-92 trend of 1.10 percent) is plotted in figure 6 . The actual and predicted values of labor productivity and the deviation of productivity from its assumed trend are displayed.
The equation does an acceptable job of tracking cyclical fluctuations in productivity, and in fact performs better in 1987-92 than in previous effect also misses the overhiring that occurred in 1988, and hence its prediction of the late 1980s decline in productivity occurs about a year too late. However, the prediction of the 1991-92 recovery of productivity is right on track. The predicted deviation of productivity from trend in 1992:4 is -2.5 percent, implying that there is substantial room for productivity growth to proceed at a rate above the assumed 1.1 percent trend during 1993-95 without implying a need to reassess the trend.4'
Forecasts for 1993-94
For any assumed growth rate of output in 1993-94, each of the equations can be used to divide output between a predicted path of hours growth and a residual path of productivity growth. For output growth, I assume a steady annual growth rate during the eight quarters of 1993-94 of 3.2 percent per year, the current consensus of the blue chip group of economic forecasters. The productivity trend is the optimal rate listed in the first section of table 8.
As shown in table 9, all equations forecast substantial growth in hours, in contrast to the zero growth that characterized 1992. The two alternative equations-based on standard and early EOE effects-predict productivity growth in the range of 1.5-1.7 percent for 1993 and 1.3-1.4 percent for 1994. These relatively slow rates of productivity growth 41. Productivity growth during the three years 1993-95 at a rate of 1.93 percent per year would bring the deviation from trend back to zero in 1995:4. would leave the deviation from trend (as plotted in the bottom of figure 6) still from -1.7 to -1.9 percent in 1994:4. The failure of productivity to recover to its trend is the counterpart of the assumed 3.2 percent growth rate of output, a much slower rate than at the same stage of previous business-cycle expansions.
Conclusion
The performance of average labor productivity and multifactor productivity in the U. S. economy was dismal from 1972 to 1991. Does the relatively rapid growth in ALP and MFP experienced in 1991-92 warrant optimism that relief has arrived from the two-decade-long productivity growth slowdown? The answer depends on whether the recent experience represents an acceleration in the underlying long-term trend or just a normal cyclical upturn that is similar to behavior in previous business cycles. To provide the answer, this paper proposes a method for separating trend from cycle.
I show that cyclical productivity does not simply parallel the cycle in output that determines the dates of NBER peaks and troughs. Instead, productivity displays complex cyclical behavior that can be decomposed into three different time frequencies. First is the high-frequency movement caused by the relatively short lag of hours behind output; this adjustment in hours is completed within four quarters after a change in output relative to trend. Second, the adjustment of hours within the first four quarters has a cumulative elasticity to output of 0.72, leaving a positive elasticity of ALP to deviations in output from trend that lasts until these deviations disappear-that is, for the duration of the business cycle. Third, productivity systematically displays an end-of-expansion slump between the peak in the growth cycle (the peak for detrended output) and the NBER peak (defined for the absolute level of output); a correction in the two years or so after the NBER peak follows; during this correction period, productivity growth is more rapid than would be predicted on the basis of output growth alone. I interpret this phenomenon as the result of overoptimism by business firms that is subsequently corrected.
This paper provides strong support for the end-of-expansion effect. This phenomenon, originally proposed in 1979 and based largely on cy-clical behavior through the mid-1970s, has now recurred in two more cyclical episodes, 1978-82 and 1989-93. Equations that include the end-ofexpansion effect provide a much improved fit of the data and are quite robust, passing a test for structural stability over the full 1954-92 period. The 1988-91 decline in productivity relative to trend and the subsequent 1991-92 recovery are tracked quite accurately. As a byproduct, inclusion of the end-of-expansion effect provides a more optimistic interpretation of the trend in productivity growth over the past five years than an equation that omits this effect.
For two alternative definitions of the end-of-expansion effect, the best-fitting 1987-92 productivity trend for the private nonfarm economy is 1.1 percent per year. When the best-fitting trends are determined separately for the manufacturing and nonfarm nonmanufacturing sectors and then aggregated, the result is 1.26 percent per year. Both of these rates are below the actual 1972-87 growth rate of 1.28 percent per year obtained by correcting the bias in the official data that arises from its fixed 1987 weighting scheme. The best-fitting 1987-92 trends at the sectoral level imply that there has been a substantial 0.5 percent per year deceleration in the growth rate of manufacturing productivity as compared to the 1972-87 growth rate corrected for the base-year data bias, offset by a modest 0.2 percent acceleration for the nonfarm nonmanufacturing sector.
How does the econometric investigation assess the widespread journalistic view that a new era of productivity-led growth is at hand? The only way to emerge with an optimistic conclusion is to focus entirely on 1991-92 and ignore the productivity stagnation of 1987-91. Those who would argue that there was a one-shot jump of productivity in 1992, as opposed to a normal cyclical correction of the type that has occurred repeatedly in past cycles, are forced to conclude that the trend from 1972 to 1991 is even more dismal than previously believed.
However, the detailed analysis does provide a few glimmers of support for some aspects of the popular view. First, the end-of-expansion effect estimated for the 1989-92 episode is among the largest on record, with an estimate of 3.2 percent cumulative overhiring (followed by a cumulative 3.2 percent decline during 1991-93 in labor input relative to the level implied by output growth). Second, the end-of-expansion effect in the recent episode has been much smaller than usual in manufacturing and much larger than usual in NFNM. Both these conclusions support the journalistic view that the current wave of corporate downsizing and restructuring is unusual, both in its size and in its concentration in the service sector and in white-collar occupations.
What the popular view misses quite consistently, however, is that the wave of downsizing does not emerge out of thin air but is the direct result of extensive overhiring in the NFNM sector during the late 1980s. If the economic difficulties of the early 1990s come to be labeled generally as an economic hangover, then the jobless recovery of 1991-92 can be viewed as a hangover reaction to a binge of overhiring in the late 1980s-just as sluggish spending by consumers and business firms has come to be viewed widely as a hangover reaction to excess indebtedness incurred in the mid-to late 1980s. Perhaps the business press could be urged to replace the common expression "corporate restructuring" with the more appropriate phrase, "correcting our past mistakes."
Comments and Discussion
Martin Neil Baily: I will comment first on the specific empirical results given in this paper, and then will talk more generally about the productivity trend and the nature of the short-term cyclical productivity puzzle. Based on his earlier work, Robert Gordon argues that a surge in productivity is a normal cyclical pattern, the counterpart to a period of very weak productivity growth or of productivity decline that precedes recessions. He has identified this pattern and labeled it an end-of-expansion effect and a subsequent bounceback.
I have found this story to be a pretty good one. Both George Perry and Charlie Schultze have told me that they burned their fingers back in the 1970s arguing that the very rapid productivity growth that accompanied the recovery from the 1974-75 recession was a sign that no longterm decline in the productivity growth trend had occurred, when in fact the improvement turned out to be ephemeral. In Charlie Schultze's case, this contributed to an overestimate of the amount of slack in the economy and an underestimate of the dangers of inflation in the late 1970s. I burned my own fingers in 1984 arguing the same thing; once again, the productivity trend, at least for the business sector as a whole, showed little improvement. The growth of productivity in recoveries makes it easy to believe mistakenly that the growth trend has improved. As Yogi Berra put it, the current wave of productivity optimism may be deja vu all over again.
In Second, in his previous work of this kind and in an earlier version of this paper, Gordon chose the timing of the end-of-expansion dummies after peeking at the data. This procedure carries the danger that the timing was chosen to get rid of some pesky residuals, leading to an upward bias in the estimated size of the effects he is capturing. In this version of his paper, he has adopted a suggestion by James Tobin and dated the dummies by the onset of the "growth recessions" that occur prior to the full-fledged NBER recessions. This is a much better procedure and I applaud Gordon for adopting it, but it does not eliminate the problem completely. The fact that Gordon ends up with lower coefficients and t-statistics after making the change in specification reinforces the concern about adding a series of dummies, rather than linking these movements in productivity to other observable economic data. Third, the specification assumes that the end-of-expansion collapse is worked off in the recovery, regardless of the strength of that recovery. In his basic specification, the end-of-expansion decline in productivity is reversed, even though employment has not recovered overall.
This last point gets me to a key issue, which is also mentioned in the Perry-Schultze paper in this volume. Relative to prior recoveries, productivity growth in this recovery is not that unusual-consistent with there being no change in the productivity trend. On the other hand, relative to past recoveries, the growth of both output and employment in this recovery is very weak and hence very atypical. So achieving strong productivity growth despite very slow output growth could indicate an improvement in the trend of productivity. The reason Gordon reaches his conclusion is that his basic specification is based implicitly on the first interpretation of the historical data. Gordon's timing of the EOE effect (by delaying the rebound period to 1991:4-1993:3) essentially recognizes that perhaps the bounceback in this recovery may not be the same as in prior recoveries because it is so weak. But in the end, he is reinforcing the sense of the arbitrariness of the exact specification and how sensitive the results are to small changes.
I do not believe that the issues can be decided based upon the data that have been put on the table. It is very early in the recovery; we simply do not have enough experience with slow recoveries to be able to tell whether strong productivity growth will continue as the recovery continues or whether output and employment will rise much more closely in step, and hence indicate continued long-term weakness in productivity.
I turn now to a broader perspective. Many of us have been studying the productivity trend for a number of years. Surely we should be able to say what has caused the slowdown and hence whether the reasons for weak growth have been overcome. Unfortunately, there is a lot more uncertainty about the causes of the slowdown than I would like. I wish I had something definitive to offer in this regard, but I do not. Still, I can suggest some helpful measures to examine.
I will list four sources of the slowdown that I would expect to be less of a problem in the 1990s. These provide reasons to expect faster growth in the future. My first source is the idea that slow growth may simply have been a matter of chance. Suppose Robert Solow was right in 1956 and technical change really is exogenous; that is to say, it is not related to anything that we can measure. Solow assumed that total factor pro-ductivity grew at a constant rate, but he has made it clear that this was an assumption of modeling convenience. Suppose instead that the productivity trend is a stochastic process. Every few years a productivity trend growth rate is picked, as though one were picking from a set of straws of different lengths. There must be some serial correlation to that stochastic process. This means that because short straws have been picked for twenty years, the expected length of the current straw-that is to say, the expected trend rate of productivity growth over the next five or ten years-is likely to be short, too. On the other hand, some weight surely should be given to the sixty to eighty years prior to 1973. This was a period of pretty good growth overall. It seems reasonable to expect that growth in the 1990s will be better than it was during the unusually weak years of the 1970s and 1980s. The economy will benefit from regression to the mean.
As a footnote, I realize that this argument could be taken in other directions. If the relevant time horizon is 500 years, not 80 or 100, then the expected growth rate for the 1990s would be pretty low. Robert Gordon and William Nordhaus have essentially made such an argument, suggesting that the period of rapid innovation and growth in the middle part of the century was anomalous in U.S. economic history. I disagree with this view and prefer to look at the period of industrialization to provide the sample from which parameters are inferred. But that is a matter of taste.
My second source of the slowdown is that the economy experienced some heavy disruptions in the 1970s and 1980s. First, oil prices gyrated, and both ups and downs were costly. Second, entire industries disappeared or were restructured in response to international specialization, changing demand, and deregulation. Third, safety and environmental regulation escalated sharply. Fourth, large demographic changes occurred in the labor market.
Disruptions like these are hard on the economy and make it difficult for managers to concentrate on raising productivity. If further economic disruptions can be avoided, stronger growth can be expected in the 1990s.
My third source of the slowdown is the idea that the electronics revolution soaked up resources that could have been used in other ways and did not provide a growth payoff of its own. Gordon quotes Steve Roach rather disparagingly in his paper. But Roach has been the leading critic of overinvestment in computers; he is now arguing that companies are beginning to achieve major gains in productivity because they have learned how to use their information technology effectively. Paul David and other economic historians have reminded us that it takes a long time to absorb a new technology, ' so it should come as no surprise that it has taken a while to use computers to raise productivity. Of course, it may be another ten years before the payoff occurs, but Steve Roach now hears a different story from companies, and so do I. This recession has clearly differed from prior recessions in that services have been hit harder than usual, consistent with the idea that restructuring is underway that will raise productivity. One reason to expect faster growth in the 1990s is that the economy can expect to reap the rewards of the heavy investment that has been made in information technology.
My fourth possible source of slow previous growth is that major changes in industrial organization have occurred in the U.S. economy. Deregulation has been substantial, foreign competition has increased, and unions are a much less powerful force in the labor market. These shifts could have hurt productivity in the short run. Deregulation can throw industries into turmoil; the airlines are an obvious example. And unions have been found in some econometric work to be associated with high levels of productivity, so that eliminating unions may have hurt productivity. But competition helps productivity growth, once the adjustment period is over. And nonunion companies seem to achieve higher productivity growth. The increasing competition in the 1970s and 1980s may have served as an investment in growth for the 1990s.
One more source of the productivity slowdown is probably neutral in its impact on future growth. This is measurement error. The quality of measurement in services is weaker than that in manufacturing or other goods production; thus as the locus of employment and innovation shifts toward services, this could lead to an increasing understatement of growth. I consider this factor neutral for the future because I do not know whether the ability of the statistics to capture productivity growth will improve or decline.
What about factors impeding growth? Are there any sources of the 1970s and 1980s slowdown that may continue or even worsen in the 1990s? My first negative is capital. Many people stress that capital in-vestment is a key element in growth-particularly equipment investment-and that slow capital growth was a source of slow productivity growth. Some of the evidence is a bit iffy, but regardless, the immediate prospects for growth generated by capital investment of all kinds are only fair. The budget deficit can crowd out either domestic investment or net foreign investment. Net foreign investment was crowded out in the 1980s; domestic investment may suffer in the 1990s unless the budget deficit is really controlled.
My second negative is a nonpositive, rather than a true negative. In an earlier discussion of Gordon's paper, I argued that demographic trends were more favorable to growth in the 1990s. But Gordon pointed out that most of this demographic improvement had already taken place by the 1980s, so demographic trends do not seem to be a promising source of additional growth for the 1990s.
My conclusion from looking at the reasons for the slowdown is that the positives look stronger than the negatives. There are reasonable grounds for hope that growth will be faster in the 1990s. But that is a very subjective choice.
I look now at the nature of the cyclical behavior of productivity. I will distinguish two alternative explanations of it. The first is that labor hoarding occurs. Firms hold excess labor for a while because they think that output will recover. They may do this to preserve firm-specific human capital or to reduce income variance among their workers. An alternative view is that there are increasing returns to scale. For example, a steel mill designed for a certain capacity will run inefficiently with slack capacity. Or an office may be set up with certain tasks allocated to certain people and have only a limited amount of flexibility to let one person cover two jobs, even if both have become effectively part-time jobs.
There is a fine line between these two views. For example, increasing returns may not really be increasing returns if there is enough time to adjust the quasi-fixed factors of production, including the organizational capital involved in allocating tasks. And on the other side, very large amounts of firm-specific human capital (or the availability of alternative tasks, such as training or maintenance, for workers to do) could make labor into a fixed factor over the relevant period of observation. In other words, a model of labor hoarding could be built that was observationally similar to a model of increasing returns.
Despite this blurring of distinction, labor hoarding is generally short term and temporary and increasing returns are generally longer term. The two approaches imply a timing difference.
The implications of this for the Gordon analysis of trend and cycle are that it affects one's view of the speed or nature of the productivity bounceback. If the cyclical pattern of labor productivity reflects primarily short-term labor hoarding, then the bounceback of productivity in the recovery could be expected to respond to the passage of time. In other words, the basic Gordon specification fits best to a short-term labor hoarding view. If the cyclical pattern of productivity is a reflection of more long-term increasing returns, then the strength of the recovery is crucial. With very slow output and input growth, the economy would not get the productivity effect of restoring efficient full capacity production in industries subject to fundamental increasing returns.
Is there any evidence to choose between these views? There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to support the labor hoarding view; James Medoff reported on a survey a few years back that added to this anecdotal evidence. Of course, increasing returns has been a big player in the recent literature, with support being offered by Robert Hall and others.
The preliminary work that I have done with Eric Bartelsman and John Haltiwanger on plant level data seems to support the increasing returns view. We expected to find that plants that were downsizing employment over a ten-year time horizon would reduce productivity less during recessions. Why hoard labor if you are not going to need it even when the recovery starts? This did not appear to be the case, and so our results did not support the labor hoarding view. Instead, we found the following. Some plants followed a pattern that was consistent with increasing returns over a ten-year time horizon. They experienced either output and input growth and productivity increases or they suffered output and input decline and productivity declines. These plants also experienced large short-term declines in productivity during recession years. In other words, the hypothesis that these plants have increasing returns would help explain not only their ten-year changes, but also their cyclical changes.
I stress that these results are very preliminary and that they only apply to manufacturing. I started out with a prior belief that labor hoarding is important and I have not lost this prior. But for what it is worth, these plant-level results are consistent with the view that if a recovery is weak, then a smaller fraction of any observed increase in productivity should be assigned to the cyclical bounceback and a larger fraction to the underlying trend. These results, therefore, make me a little more optimistic about productivity growth over the next few years.
So where do I end up? Gordon is correct that the recent productivity data taken by themselves fail to provide clear evidence of an increase in the productivity trend, or at least evidence of anything more than the pickup that would be expected, given the way output is measured. False optimism has followed the last two recessions, so the cautious policymaker today should not base policy decisions on the assumption that the trend has improved. My advice would be to assume the worst and then wait and see.
Despite this, I remain somewhat optimistic about the future. Nothing in the current data refutes the hypothesis of improved productivity growth and there are some reasons to expect improvements to occurparticularly evidence of changes underway in the service sector. I look forward to finding out over the next several years what these changes really amount to.
General Discussion
Part of the discussion focused on whether the end-of-expansion effect identified by Robert Gordon was caused by firms' overhiring of labor. James Tobin proposed a model that would yield similar effects but did not rely on theories of overhiring. In this model, firms operate below the production function during downturns in the business cycle. After the trough, output may increase without corresponding increases in labor input. The higher productivity achieved could be seen as firms' returning to the production frontier, and not as the aftermath of overhiring. In a related vein, Tobin noted that the last expansion had peaked in the first quarter of 1989 on a GNP-gap basis, so that firms have had a long time in which to shed labor. By now, it is unlikely that much excess labor would remain. Consequently, a productivity surprise now was more likely to reflect a change in the level or trend of productivity, rather than a purely cyclical upswing.
Other participants accepted the descriptive hypothesis of overhiring advanced by Gordon, but asked for a better explanation of it. Henry Aaron suggested a need for a model of expectations formation by firms to explain the overhiring phenomenon. Christopher Carroll proposed that overhiring at the end of expansionary periods was not necessarily irrational because firms are not able to identify the start of recessions accurately. He pointed to 1966-67 and 1985-86 as examples of periods when recessions did not develop after periods of slowing growth. While Robert Hall felt that this was a side issue to the subject of the paper, he proposed that one could test for irrationality based on published or econometric forecasts. Gordon replied that he remained neutral on the issue of whether firms were rational or not in their hiring policies. However, he reported that his attempts to build an autoregressive forecasting model that replicated the end-of-expansion effect had been unsuccessful. Both Robert Hall and Charles Schultze commented that it was too early to make any definitive statements about productivity trends after the last recession, despite evidence of an initial productivity surprise. Benjamin Friedman welcomed Gordon's cautioning against premature prophecies of new eras of productivity growth that have accompanied previous recoveries, such as in 1984. Daniel Sichel suggested examining measures of wages and prices as another way of testing whether a recent productivity surprise has occurred. However, Gordon pointed out that typically only 20 percent of a productivity improvement shows up as lower inflation; the rest results in higher profits. Hence a productivity surprise would not be readily detected in prices.
Gordon said that he put more weight than Martin Baily on the longrun view of productivity changes, which Baily dubbed the Nordhausdepletion view. According to this view, what is surprising is not the slow productivity growth in the last twenty years, but rather the exceptionally high growth between the 1920s and 1960s. Before this period, productivity growth rates were below those measured in recent years. Gordon also commented on the implication of the argument by J. Bradford De Long and Lawrence Summers in BPEA, 2:1992 that there is a large social return on equipment investment. Gordon pointed out that, if equipment were seen as the only type of capital that produces output, then calculations of multifactor productivity growth for the United States would show zero or negative growth.
